PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE
SOCRATES/THEODORUS/THEAETETUS
Soc. #144 Tell me then, if you have met with any one who is good for anything.
Theod. Yes,Theaetetus, Socrates, is his name.
Soc. come and sit by me.
Soc. . . There is a little difficulty which I want you and the company to aid me in investigating. Will you answer me a question - What is knowledge? #146
Theaet. I will answer as you bid me; and if I make a mistake, you wil doubtless correct me.
Soc. We will, if we can.
Theaet. - geometry, and those which you just now mentioned - are knowledge; and I would include the art of the cobbler and other craftsmen; these, each and all of them, are knowledge.
Soc. we were not going to count them, but we wanted to know the nature of knowledge in the abstract. Am I not right?. . . .#147 And when a man is asked what science or knowledge is, to give in answer the name of some art or science is ridiculous; for the question is, "What is knowledge?' and he replies, 'A knowledge of this or that.'
#149 Theaet. I cannot shake off ta feeling of anxiety.
Soc. pangs of labour, my dear Theaetetus; you have something within you which you are bringing to the birth. . .And have you never heard. . . that I practice midwifery. . . .. . .Such are the midwives, whose task is a very important one, but not so important as mine; for women do not bring into the world at one time real children, and at another time counterfeits which are with difficulty distinguished from them; if they did, then the discernment of the true and false birth would be the crowning achievement of the art of midwifery - you would think so?
Theaet. Indeed I Should.
Soc. Well, my art of midwifery is in most respects like theirs; but differs, in that I attend men and not women, and I look after their souls when they are in labour, and not after their bodies: and the triumph of my art is in thoroughly examining whether the thought which the mind of the young man brings forth is a false idol or a noble and true birth. Once more, then, Theaetetus, I repeat my old question, 'What is knowledge?' - and do not say that you cannot tell; but quit yourself like a man.
Theaet. At any rate, Socrates, after such an exhortation I should be ashamed of not trying to do my best. Now he who knows perceives what he knows, and, asfaras I can see at present, knowledge is perception.
Soc. let us examine together this conception of yours, and see whether it is a true birth or a mere wind-egg: - You say that knowledge is perception?
Theaet. Yes.
#152 Soc. Well you have delivered yourself of a very importrant doctrine about knowledge; it is indeed the opinion of Protagoras, who has another way of expressing it. Man, he say, is the measure of all things, of the existence of things that are, and of the non-existence of things that are not. . .Does he not say that things are to you such as they appear to you, and to me such as they appear to me, and that you and I are men?
Theaet. Yes, he says so.
Soc. A wise man is not likely to talk nonsense. Let us try to understand him: the same wind is blowing, and yet one of us may be cold and the other not, or one may be slightly and the other very cold?. . . .Now is the wind, regarded not in relation to us but absolutely, cold or not, or are we to say, with Protagoras, that the wind is cold to him who is cold, and not to him who is not?
Theaet. I suppose the last.
Soc. And 'appears to him' means the same as 'he perceives.'
Theaet. True.
Soc. Then appearing and perceiving coincide in the case of hot and cold, and in similar instances; for things appear, or may be supposed to be, to each one such as he perceives them?
Soc. Then perception is always of existence, and being the same as knowledge is unerring? In the name of the Graces, what an almighty wise man Protagoras must have been! He spoke these things in a parable to the common herd, like you and me, but told the truth, 'his Truth,' in secret to his own disciples.
Theaet. What do you mean, Socrates?
Soc. I am about to speak of a high argument, in which all things are said to be relative; you cannot rightly call anything by any name, such as great or small, heavy or light, for the great will be small and the heavy light - there is no single thing or quality, but out of motion and change and admixture all things are becoming relatively to one another, which 'becoming' is by us incorrectly called being, but is really becoming, for nothing ever is, but all thing are becoming. Summon all philosophers - Protagoras, Heracleitus, Empedocles, and the rest of them, one after another, and with the exception of Parmenides they will agree with you in this, . . . all things are the off spring of flux and motion.
Soc. There are plenty of other proofs which will show that motion is the source of what is called being and becoming, and inactivitry of not-being and destruction. . . Then motion is good, and rest an evil, to the soul as well as to the body?
Theaet. I believe, Socrates, that you have truly explained his meaning.
#154Soc. It would follow that what we call a colour is, in each case, peculiar to each percipient. . .Would it not be true that it never appears exactly the same to you, because you are never exactly the same?. . . .#155 Theaet. Yes, that would be my desire.
#156 Soc. Their first principle is, that all is motion, and upon this all the affections of which we were just now speaking are supposed to depend: there is nothing but motion. . . .#157. . . .and as I said at first, there arises a general reflection, that there is no one self-existent thing, but everything is becoming and in relation; and being must be altogether abolished, although from habit and ignorance we are compelled even in this discussion to retain the use of the term. But 'something,' or 'becoming to something,' or 'to me,' or 'this' or 'that,' or any other detaining name to be used; in the language of nature all things are being created and destroyed, coming into being and passing into new forms; nor can any name fix or detain them; he who attempts to fix them is easily refuted. And this should be the way of speaking, not only of particulars but of aggregates; such aggregates as are expressed in the word 'man,' or 'stone,' or any name of an animal or of a class. O Theaetetus, are not these speculations sweet as honey? And do you not like the taste of them in the mouth?
Theaet. I do not know what to say, Socrates, for, indeed, I cannot make out whether you are giving your own opinion or only wanting to draw me out.
#160Soc. We are or become in relation to one another; there is a law which binds us one to the other, but not to any other existence, nor each of us to himself; and therfore we can only be bound to one another; so that whether a person says that a thing is or becomes, he must say that it is or becomes to, or of, or in relation to something else; but he must not say or allow any one else to say that anything is or becomes absolutely: - such is our conclusion.
Theaet. Very true, Socrates.
Soc. Then, if that which acts upon me has relation to me and to no other, I and no other am the percipient of it? Then my perception is true to me, being inseparable from my own being; and, as Protagoras says, to myself I am judge of what is and what is not to me.
Soc. How then, if I never err, and if my mind never trips in the conception of being or becoming, can I fail of knowing that which I perceive?
Soc. Then you were quite right in affirming that knowledge is only perception; and the meaning turns out to be the same, whether with Homer and Heracleitus, and all that company, you say that all is motion and flux, or with the great sage Protagoras, that man is the measure of all things; or with Theaetetus, that, given these premises, perception is knowledge. Am I not right, Theaetetus, and is not this your new-born child, of which I have deliverd you? What say you?
Theaet. I cannot but agree, Socrates.
Soc. Then this is the child,.
Soc. Shall I tell you, Theodorus, what amazes me in your acquaintance Protagoras?
Theod. What is it?
Soc. I am charmed with his doctrine, that what appears is to each one, but I wonder that he did not begin his book on Truth with a declaration that a pig which has sensation, is the measure of all things; then he might have shown a magnificent contempt for our opinion of him . . . no better than a tadpole, not to speak of his fellow-men - would not this have produced an over powering effect? For if truth is only sensation, and no man can discern another's feelings better than he, or has any superior right to detrermine whether his opinion is true or false, but each, as we have several times repeated, is to himself the sole judge, and everything that he judges is true and right, why, my friend, should Protagoreas be preferred to the place of wisdom and instruction, and deserve to be well paid, and we poor ignoramuses have to go to him, if each one is the measure of his own wisdom? . . . #162 I say nothing of the ridiculous predicament in which my own midwifery and the whole art of dialectic is placed.
Soc. raised to the level of the wisest of men, or indeed of the gods?
Theaet. At first hearing, I was quite satisfied with the doctrine, that whatever appears is to each one, but now the face of things has changed.
#169 Soc. he assumed all to be equal and sufficient in wisdom; . . His words are, 'What seems to a man, is to him." #170 And are not we, Protagoras, uttering the opinion of man, or rather of all mankind, when we say that every one thinks himself wiser than other men in some things, and their inferior in others? . . .
Theod. Exactly.
Soc. How then, Protagoras, would you have us treat the argument? Shall we say that the opinions of men are always true.
Theod. The thing is incredible, Socrates.
Soc. That absurdity is necessarily involved in the thesis which declares man to be the measure of all things. . .Are we to assert that what you think is true to you, (is) false to ten thousand others?
Theod. No other inference seems to be possible.
#177 Soc. And how about Protagoras himself? . . But if you suppose that he himself thought, and that the multitude does not agree with him, you must begin by allowing that in whatever proportion the many are more than one, in that proportion his truth is more untrue than true.
Theod. That would follow if the truth is supposed to vary with individual opinion.
Soc. And the best of the joke is, that he acknowledges the truth of their opinion who believes his own opinion to be false; for he admits that the opinions of all men (including his own) are true. . .And does he not allow that his own opinion is false, if he admits that the opinion of those who think him false is true?
#172 Soc. politics, while affirming that just and unjust, honourable and disgraceful, holy and unholy, are in reality to each state such as the state thinks and makes lawful, and that in determining these matters no individual or state is wiser than another. . . .But in the other case, I mean when they speak of justice and injustice, piety and impiety, they are confident that in nature these have no existence or essence of their own - the truth is that which is agreed on at the time of the agreement, and as long as the agreement lasts; and this is the philosophy of many who don't altogether go along with Protagoras.
(#173-#177 is an apparent digression, in which is set forth, not the opposition of sense and knowledge, but a parallel contrast between the ways of the lawyer and philosopher.)
#178 Soc. Suppose now, that we ask Protagoras, or one of his disciples, a question: - O, Protagoras, we will say to him, Man is, as you declare, the measure of all things - white, heavy, light: of all such things he is the judge; for he has the critrerion of them in himself, and when he thinks that things are such as he experiences them to be, he thinks what is and is true to himself. is it not so?. . . .#180 Their great care is, not to allow of any settled principle either in their arguments or in their minds, conceiving, as I imagine, that any such principle would be stationary for they are at war with the stationary, and do what they can to drive it out everywhere. . . .#183 We shall not then hamper them with words expressive of rest.
#210 Soc. You are still in labour and travail, my dear friend, or have you brought all that you have to say about knowledge to the birth?
Theaet. I am sure, Socrates, that you have elicited from me a good deal more than ever was in me.
Soc. And does not my art show that you have brought forth wind, and that the offspring of your brain are not worth bringing up"
Theaet. Very true.
Soc. But if, Theaetetus, you should ever conceive afresh, . . .soberer and humbler and gentler to other men, and will be too modest to fancy that you know what you do not know. These are the limits of my art.