It is a dreadful thing to say that Mr. W. B. Yeats does not
understand fairyland. But I do say it. He is an ironical Irishman,
full of intellectual reactions. He is not stupid enough to
understand fairyland. Fairies prefer people of the yokel type like
myself; people who gape and grin and do as they are told. Mr.
Yeats reads into elfland all the righteous insurrection of his own
race. But the lawlessness of Ireland is a Christian lawlessness,
rounded on reason and justice. The Fenian is rebelling against
something he understands only too well; but the true citizen of
fairyland is obeying something that he does not understand at all.
In the fairy tale an incomprehensible happiness rests upon an
incomprehensible condition. A box is opened, and all evils fly
out. A word is forgotten, and cities perish. A lamp is lit, and love
flies away. A flower is plucked, and human lives are forfeited.
An apple is eaten, and the hope of God is gone.
This is the tone of fairy tales, and it is certainly not lawlessness
or even liberty, though men under a mean modern tyranny may
think it liberty by comparison. People out of Portland Gaol might
think Fleet Street free; but closer study will prove that both fairies
and journalists are the slaves of duty. Fairy godmothers seem at
least as strict as other godmothers. Cinderella received a coach
out of Wonderland and a coachman out of nowhere, but she
received a command -- which might have come out of Brixton --
that she should be back by twelve. Also, she had a glass slipper;
and it cannot be a coincidence that glass is so common a
substance in folk-lore. This princess lives in a glass castle, that
princess on a glass hill; this one sees all things in a mirror; they
may all live in glass houses if they will not throw stones. For this
thin glitter of glass everywhere is the expression of the fact that
the happiness is bright but brittle, like the substance most easily
smashed by a housemaid or a cat. And this fairy-tale sentiment
also sank into me and became my sentiment towards the whole
world. I felt and feel that life itself is as bright as the diamond,
but as brittle as the window-pane; and when the heavens were
compared to the terrible crystal I can remember a shudder. I was
afraid that God would drop the cosmos with a crash.
Remember, however, that to be breakable is not the same as to be
perishable. Strike a glass, and it will not endure an instant;
simply do not strike it, and it will endure a thousand years. Such,
it seemed, was the joy of man, either in elfland or on earth; the
happiness depended on not doing something which you could at
any moment do and which, very often, it was not obvious why
you should not do. Now, the point here is that to me this did not
seem unjust. If the miller's third son said to the fairy, "Explain
why I must not stand on my head in the fairy palace," the other
might fairly reply, "Well, if it comes to that, explain the fairy
palace." If Cinderella says, "How is it that I must leave the ball at
twelve?" her godmother might answer, "How is it that you are
going there till twelve?" If I leave a man in my will ten talking
elephants and a hundred winged horses, he cannot complain if
the conditions partake of the slight eccentricity of the gift. He
must not look a winged horse in the mouth. And it seemed to me
that existence was itself so very eccentric a legacy that I could not
complain of not understanding the limitations of the vision when
I did not understand the vision they limited. The frame was no
stranger than the picture. The veto might well be as wild as the
vision; it might be as startling as the sun, as elusive as the
waters, as fantastic and terrible as the towering trees.
For this reason (we may call it the fairy godmother philosophy) I
never could join the young men of my time in feeling what they
called the general sentiment of revolt. I should have resisted, let
us hope, any rules that were evil, and with these and their
definition I shall deal in another chapter. But I did not feel
disposed to resist any rule merely because it was mysterious.
Estates are sometimes held by foolish forms, the breaking of a
stick or the payment of a peppercorn: I was willing to hold the
huge estate of earth and heaven by any such feudal fantasy. It
could not well be wilder than the fact that I was allowed to hold it
at all. At this stage I give only one ethical instance to show my
meaning. I could never mix in the common murmur of that rising
generation against monogamy, because no restriction on sex
seemed so odd and unexpected as sex itself. To be allowed, like
Endymion, to make love to the moon and then to complain that
Jupiter kept his own moons in a harem seemed to me (bred on
fairy tales like Endymion's) a vulgar anti-climax. Keeping to one
woman is a small price for so much as seeing one woman. To
complain that I could only be married once was like complaining
that I had only been born once. It was incommensurate with the
terrible excitement of which one was talking. It showed, not an
exaggerated sensibility to sex, but a curious insensibility to it. A
man is a fool who complains that he cannot enter Eden by five
gates at once. Polygamy is a lack of the realization of sex; it is
like a man plucking five pears in mere absence of mind. The
aesthetes touched the last insane limits of language in their eulogy
on lovely things. The thistledown made them weep; a burnished
beetle brought them to their knees. Yet their emotion never
impressed me for an instant, for this reason, that it never
occurred to them to pay for their pleasure in any sort of symbolic
sacrifice. Men (I felt) might fast forty days for the sake of
hearing a blackbird sing. Men might go through fire to find a
cowslip. Yet these lovers of beauty could not even keep sober for
the blackbird. They would not go through common Christian
marriage by way of recompense to the cowslip. Surely one might
pay for extraordinary joy in ordinary morals. Oscar Wilde said
that sunsets were not valued because we could not pay for
sunsets. But Oscar Wilde was wrong; we can pay for sunsets.
We can pay for them by not being Oscar Wilde.
Well, I left the fairy tales lying on the floor of the nursery, and I
have not found any books so sensible since. I left the nurse
guardian of tradition and democracy, and I have not found any
modern type so sanely radical or so sanely conservative. But the
matter for important comment was here: that when I first went
out into the mental atmosphere of the modern world, I found that
the modern world was positively opposed on two points to my
nurse and to the nursery tales. It has taken me a long time to find
out that the modern world is wrong and my nurse was right. The
really curious thing was this: that modern thought contradicted
this basic creed of my boyhood on its two most essential
doctrines. I have explained that the fairy tales rounded in me two
convictions; first, that this world is a wild and startling place,
which might have been quite different, but which is quite
delightful; second, that before this wildness and delight one may
well be modest and submit to the queerest limitations of so queer
a kindness. But I found the whole modern world running like a
high tide against both my tendernesses; and the shock of that
collision created two sudden and spontaneous sentiments, which
I have had ever since and which, crude as they were, have since
hardened into convictions.
First, I found the whole modern world talking scientific fatalism;
saying that everything is as it must always have been, being
unfolded without fault from the beginning. The leaf on the tree is
green because it could never have been anything else. Now, the
fairy-tale philosopher is glad that the leaf is green precisely
because it might have been scarlet. He feels as if it had turned
green an instant before he looked at it. He is pleased that snow is
white on the strictly reasonable ground that it might have been
black. Every colour has in it a bold quality as of choice; the red
of garden roses is not only decisive but dramatic, like suddenly
spilt blood. He feels that something has been done. But the great
determinists of the nineteenth century were strongly against this
native feeling that something had happened an instant before. In
fact, according to them, nothing ever really had happened since
the beginning of the world. Nothing ever had happened since
existence had happened; and even about the date of that they were
not very sure.
The modern world as I found it was solid for modern Calvinism,
for the necessity of things being as they are. But when I came to
ask them I found they had really no proof of this unavoidable
repetition in things except the fact that the things were repeated.
Now, the mere repetition made the things to me rather more
weird than more rational. It was as if, having seen a curiously
shaped nose in the street and dismissed it as an accident, I had
then seen six other noses of the same astonishing shape. I should
have fancied for a moment that it must be some local secret
society. So one elephant having a trunk was odd; but all
elephants having trunks looked like a plot. I speak here only of
an emotion, and of an emotion at once stubborn and subtle. But
the repetition in Nature seemed sometimes to be an excited
repetition, like that of an angry schoolmaster saying the same
thing over and over again. The grass seemed signalling to me
with all its fingers at once; the crowded stars seemed bent upon
being understood. The sun would make me see him if he rose a
thousand times. The recurrences of the universe rose to the
maddening rhythm of an incantation, and I began to see an idea.
All the towering materialism which dominates the modern mind
rests ultimately upon one assumption; a false assumption. It is
supposed that if a thing goes on repeating itself it is probably
dead; a piece of clockwork. People feel that if the universe was
personal it would vary; if the sun were alive it would dance. This
is a fallacy even in relation to known fact. For the variation in
human affairs is generally brought into them, not by life, but by
death; by the dying down or breaking off of their strength or
desire. A man varies his movements because of some slight
element of failure or fatigue. He gets into an omnibus because he
is tired of walking; or he walks because he is tired of sitting still.
But if his life and joy were so gigantic that he never tired of
going to Islington, he might go to Islington as regularly as the
Thames goes to Sheerness. The very speed and ecstacy of his life
would have the stillness of death. The sun rises every morning. I
do not rise every morning; but the variation is due not to my
activity, but to my inaction. Now, to put the matter in a popular
phrase, it might be true that the sun rises regularly because he
never gets tired of rising. His routine might be due, not to a
lifelessness, but to a rush of life. The thing I mean can be seen,
for instance, in children, when they find some game or joke that
they specially enjoy. A child kicks his legs rhythmically through
excess, not absence, of life. Because children have abounding
vitality, because they are in spirit fierce and free, therefore they
want things repeated and unchanged. They always say, "Do it
again"; and the grown-up person does it again until he is nearly
dead. For grown-up people are not strong enough to exult in
monotony. But perhaps God is strong enough to exult in
monotony. It is possible that God says every morning, "Do it
again" to the sun; and every evening, "Do it again" to the moon.
It may not be automatic necessity that makes all daisies alike; it
may be that God makes every daisy separately, but has never got
tired of making them. It may be that He has the eternal appetite of
infancy; for we have sinned and grown old, and our Father is
younger than we. The repetition in Nature may not be a mere
recurrence; it may be a theatrical encore. Heaven may encore the
bird who laid an egg. If the human being conceives and brings
forth a human child instead of bringing forth a fish, or a bat, or a
griffin, the reason may not be that we are fixed in an animal fate
without life or purpose. It may be that our little tragedy has
touched the gods, that they admire it from their starry galleries,
and that at the end of every human drama man is called again and
again before the curtain. Repetition may go on for millions of
years, by mere choice, and at any instant it may stop. Man may
stand on the earth generation after generation, and yet each birth
be his positively last appearance.
This was my first conviction; made by the shock of my childish
emotions meeting the modern creed in mid-career. I had always
vaguely felt facts to be miracles in the sense that they are
wonderful: now I began to think them miracles in the stricter
sense that they were wilful. I mean that they were, or might be,
repeated exercises of some will. In short, I had always believed
that the world involved magic: now I thought that perhaps it
involved a magician. And this pointed a profound emotion
always present and sub-conscious; that this world of ours has
some purpose; and if there is a purpose, there is a person. I had
always felt life first as a story: and if there is a story there is a
story-teller.
But modern thought also hit my second human tradition. It went
against the fairy feeling about strict limits and conditions. The
one thing it loved to talk about was expansion and largeness.
Herbert Spencer would have been greatly annoyed if any one had
called him an imperialist, and therefore it is highly regrettable that
nobody did. But he was an imperialist of the lowest type. He
popularized this contemptible notion that the size of the solar
system ought to over-awe the spiritual dogma of man. Why
should a man surrender his dignity to the solar system any more
than to a whale? If mere size proves that man is not the image of
God, then a whale may be the image of God; a somewhat
formless image; what one might call an impressionist portrait. It
is quite futile to argue that man is small compared to the cosmos;
for man was always small compared to the nearest tree. But
Herbert Spencer, in his headlong imperialism, would insist that
we had in some way been conquered and annexed by the
astronomical universe. He spoke about men and their ideals
exactly as the most insolent Unionist talks about the Irish and
their ideals. He turned mankind into a small nationality. And his
evil influence can be seen even in the most spirited and
honourable of later scientific authors; notably in the early
romances of Mr. H. G. Wells. Many moralists have in an
exaggerated way represented the earth as wicked. But Mr. Wells
and his school made the heavens wicked. We should lift up our
eyes to the stars from whence would come our ruin.
But the expansion of which I speak was much more evil than all
this. I have remarked that the materialist, like the madman, is in
prison; in the prison of one thought. These people seemed to
think it singularly inspiring to keep on saying that the prison was
very large. The size of this scientific universe gave one no
novelty, no relief. The cosmos went on for ever, but not in its
wildest constellation could there be anything really interesting;
anything, for instance, such as forgiveness or free will. The
grandeur or infinity of the secret of its cosmos added nothing to
it. It was like telling a prisoner in Reading gaol that he would be
glad to hear that the gaol now covered half the county. The
warder would have nothing to show the man except more and
more long corridors of stone lit by ghastly lights and empty of all
that is human. So these expanders of the universe had nothing to
show us except more and more infinite corridors of space lit by
ghastly suns and empty of all that is divine.
In fairyland there had been a real law; a law that could be broken,
for the definition of a law is something that can be broken. But
the machinery of this cosmic prison was something that could not
be broken; for we ourselves were only a part of its machinery.
We were either unable to do things or we were destined to do
them. The idea of the mystical condition quite disappeared; one
can neither have the firmness of keeping laws nor the fun of
breaking them. The largeness of this universe had nothing of that
freshness and airy outbreak which we have praised in the
universe of the poet. This modern universe is literally an empire;
that is, it was vast, but it is not free. One went into larger and
larger windowless rooms, rooms big with Babylonian
perspective; but one never found the smallest window or a
whisper of outer air.
Their infernal parallels seemed to expand with distance; but for
me all good things come to a point, swords for instance. So
finding the boast of the big cosmos so unsatisfactory to my
emotions I began to argue about it a little; and I soon found that
the whole attitude was even shallower than could have been
expected. According to these people the cosmos was one thing
since it had one unbroken rule. Only (they would say) while it is
one thing it is also the only thing there is. Why, then, should one
worry particularly to call it large? There is nothing to compare it
with. It would be just as sensible to call it small. A man may say,
"I like this vast cosmos, with its throng of stars and its crowd of
varied creatures." But if it comes to that why should not a man
say, "I like this cosy little cosmos, with its decent number of
stars and as neat a provision of live stock as I wish to see"? One
is as good as the other; they are both mere sentiments. It is mere
sentiment to rejoice that the sun is larger than the earth; it is quite
as sane a sentiment to rejoice that the sun is no larger than it is. A
man chooses to have an emotion about the largeness of the
world; why should he not choose to have an emotion about its
smallness?
It happened that I had that emotion. When one is fond of
anything one addresses it by diminutives, even if it is an elephant
or a life-guardsman. The reason is, that anything, however huge,
that can be conceived of as complete, can be conceived of as
small. If military moustaches did not suggest a sword or tusks a
tail, then the object would be vast because it would be
immeasurable. But the moment you can imagine a guardsman
you can imagine a small guardsman. The moment you really see
an elephant you can call it "Tiny." If you can make a statue of a
thing you can make a statuette of it. These people professed that
the universe was one coherent thing; but they were not fond of
the universe. But I was frightfully fond of the universe and
wanted to address it by a diminutive. I often did so; and it never
seemed to mind. Actually and in truth I did feel that these dim
dogmas of vitality were better expressed by calling the world
small than by calling it large. For about infinity there was a sort
of carelessness which was the reverse of the fierce and pious care
which I felt touching the pricelessness and the peril of life. They
showed only a dreary waste; but I felt a sort of sacred thrift. For
economy is far more romantic than extravagance. To them stars
were an unending income of halfpence; but I felt about the golden
sun and the silver moon as a schoolboy feels if he has one
sovereign and one shilling.
These subconscious convictions are best hit off by the colour and
tone of certain tales. Thus I have said that stories of magic alone
can express my sense that life is not only a pleasure but a kind of
eccentric privilege. I may express this other feeling of cosmic
cosiness by allusion to another book always read in boyhood,
"Robinson Crusoe," which I read about this time, and which
owes its eternal vivacity to the fact that it celebrates the poetry of
limits, nay, even the wild romance of prudence. Crusoe is a man
on a small rock with a few comforts just snatched from the sea:
the best thing in the book is simply the list of things saved from
the wreck. The greatest of poems is an inventory. Every kitchen
tool becomes ideal because Crusoe might have dropped it in the
sea. It is a good exercise, in empty or ugly hours of the day, to
look at anything, the coal-scuttle or the book-case, and think how
happy one could be to have brought it out of the sinking ship on
to the solitary island. But it is a better exercise still to remember
how all things have had this hair-breadth escape: everything has
been saved from a wreck. Every man has had one horrible
adventure: as a hidden untimely birth he had not been, as infants
that never see the light. Men spoke much in my boyhood of
restricted or ruined men of genius: and it was common to say that
many a man was a Great Might-Have-Been. To me it is a more
solid and startling fact that any man in the street is a Great
Might-Not-Have-Been.
But I really felt (the fancy may seem foolish) as if all the order
and number of things were the romantic remnant of Crusoe's
ship. That there are two sexes and one sun, was like the fact that
there were two guns and one axe. It was poignantly urgent that
none should be lost; but somehow, it was rather fun that none
could be added. The trees and the planets seemed like things
saved from the wreck: and when I saw the Matterhorn I was glad
that it had not been overlooked in the confusion. I felt economical
about the stars as if they were sapphires (they are called so in
Milton's Eden): I hoarded the hills. For the universe is a single
jewel, and while it is a natural cant to talk of a jewel as peerless
and priceless, of this jewel it is literally true. This cosmos is
indeed without peer and without price: for there cannot be
another one.
Thus ends, in unavoidable inadequacy, the attempt to utter the
unutterable things. These are my ultimate attitudes towards life;
the soils for the seeds of doctrine. These in some dark way I
thought before I could write, and felt before I could think: that
we may proceed more easily afterwards, I will roughly
recapitulate them now. I felt in my bones; first, that world does
not explain itself. It may be miracle with a supernatural
explanation; it may be a conjuring trick, with a natural
explanation. But the explanation of the conjuring trick, if it is to
satisfy me, will have to be better than the natural explanations I
have heard. The thing is magic, true or false. Second, I came to
feel as if magic must have a meaning, and meaning must have
some one to mean it. There was something personal in the world,
as in a work of art; whatever it meant it meant violently. Third, I
thought this purpose beautiful in its old design, in spite of its
defects, such as dragons. Fourth, that the proper form of thanks
to it is some form of humility and restraint: we should thank God
for beer and Burgundy by not drinking too much of them. We
owed, also, an obedience to whatever made us. And last, and
strangest, there had come into my mind a vague and vast
impression that in some way all good was a remnant to be stored
and held sacred out of some primordial ruin. Man had saved his
good as Crusoe saved his goods: he had saved them from a
wreck. All this I felt and the age gave me no encouragement to
feel it. And all this time I had not even thought of Christian
theology.
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