(Of these three great ideas, i.e. being, truth and goodness, being) is sovereign as, in the case of the second trio, justice is the governing idea in relation to liberty and equality.

Matters that we have come to understand better through our consideration of truth - the distinction between judgments having certitude and judgments in the realm of doubt, the distinction between the sphere of truth and the sphere of taste - lay the gr ound for a better understanding of goodness.

We have faced the question about the subjective aspect of truth and its relation to the objective aspect; and we have seen why the objective aspect is primary and controlling. This will guide us in dealing with similar questions about goodness, questi ons that we will find more insistent and more difficult.

Was the skeptical Montaigne correct when he said that there is nothing good or evil but thinking makes it so?

Is there no objective aspect of goodness? Can some of our judgments about what is good and evil, or about what is right and wrong, be placed in the sphere of truth, leaving others in the sphere of taste? What is the basis for allocating them in this way? Does the maxim De gustibus non disputandum est apply without exception to all judgments about goodness; or do some fall under the maxim De veritate disputandum est?

The milder forms of skepticism that I have called subjectivism and relativism are rampant not only in the popular mind but also in academic circles, especially among sociologists and other behavioral scientists and even among philosophers. I think I h ave shown how they can be combated with regard to truth. I hope I shall be able to persuade readers that the mistakes of subjectivism and relativism can also be corrected with regard to goodness.

The importance of doing so should be obvious. If all our judgments about good and evil, right and wrong, are purely subjective; if they are simply expressions of emotional preference; if there is no point in resorting to rational argument when we find ourselves in conflict with others about such matters, the practical consequences are far-reaching and pervasive. They impinge upon the conduct of our personal and public lives at every turn.

Subjectivism and relativism with regard to beauty are much less amenable to correction than with regard to goodness. Fortunately, it is also less important to overcome them there, at least so far as their practical effect upon our lives is concerned.< /P>

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The following are supplementary notes relating to the material of this chapter.

What question does this chapter raise? Adler is asking whether:

1) all moral judgments are subjective and therefore neither true nor false, or whether: 2) there are, in moral matters, judgments that are either true or false. Remember that we have already seen that if a judgment is true, it is true for all people, in all cultures and for all time.

The first alternative is sustained on the basis of the following principle: "There is nothing good or evil, but thinking makes it so."

Moral judgments, according to this position, are statements about the subject making them and about his or her personal tastes. If it is true that all moral judgments are merely matters of taste, then we should "fully acquiese in irreducible plural ism."

The second alternative is based on the conviction that morals can be, to some extent, matters of truth and falsehood, and therefore should be disputed with a view to seeking unanimity, i.e. they should be the object of rational investigation.

The priority of BEING over TRUTH, and of TRUTH over GOODNESS, is the

rational basis upon which the whole Western view of PERSON is based.

Granted that the purpose of any person's life is to reach for the fulfillment of their person, and that a human being is not a totally self-sufficient being, it follows that each person has certain needs which must be fulfilled if he/she is to come fu lly alive.

Granted that reality both promises and threatens the developing human life, each person has a need to embrace and reject BEING. Each person has a need for BEING, and for NON-BEING. Yet there is, in terms of human needs, a clear priority of the need fo r BEING over NON-BEING.

The next requisite, in terms of a person coming to the fulness of life, is for the person to see reality in both its promise and its threat. But because a being is what it is, and is not necessarily, what each person perceives it to be, the reality p recedes and measures the seeing of it. BEING precedes TRUTH, BEING, as seen, is TRUTH. A person has the ability to consciously reflect upon reality, and upon reality's capacity to either enhance or destroy the human person. But reality's power to enhanc e or destroy the human person is PRIOR TO AND APART FROM OUR AWARENESS OF IT.

In view of the goal which is to come fully alive (eudemia), this process is completed with regards to any one particular human act, by freely choosing to act in accord with the prior reflection. Moral knowledge is completed in choosing to embr ace the promise and to reject the threat.

Knowledge is prior to love, but is radically incomplete in itself. Moral knowledge is completed with the loving of the promise (the good) or the rejecting of the threat (evil).

If the above reasoning is correct, there is implied in it the priority of being over truth, and the priority of truth over the good. Another way of stating the same thing is to say that "is" precedes "knowing" and "knowing" precedes "loving."

(1)This material is taken largely from the 9th chap. of SIX GREAT IDEAS, by M. Adler