Seeking the Truth(1)
When a problem is raised, and people begin to argue as to the truth or falsehood of a particular judgment, is unanimity a proper goal toward which the discussion should be directed?. . . . .What is the most reasonable attitude toward a differenc e of opinion among people in matters of taste)
Different disciplines have different methods that they follow in their pursuit of truth. Reflect for a moment on the distinction of method in areas such as mathematics, the physical sciences, the social sciences, and history.
Differences aside, the pursuit of truth in all branches of organized knowledge involves 1) the addition of new truths to the body of settled or established truths already achieved, 2) the replacement of less accurate or less comprehensive formulations by better ones, 3) the discovery of errors or inadequacies together with the rectification of judgments found erroneous or otherwise at fault, and 4) the discarding of generalizations - or of hypotheses and theories that have been falsified by negative in stances.
The complete realization of the ideal that is the goal - the whole truth and nothing but the truth - will never be achieved in any stretch of time. The pursuit is endless. In the main it is progressive, though there are periods when no advances are m ade and (when there are even movements backward toward error).
Viewing the pursuit of truth retrospectively, we find that experts who are competent to judge - mathematicians, scientists, historians, each in their own departments of learning - have reached agreement about a host of judgments that they have come to regard as settled or established truths in their respective fields. This does not mean, of course, that all these agreed-upon truths have the finality and incorrigibility of certitude. (They are) temporarily undisputed by experts competent to judge.
Looking toward the future, the ongoing pursuit of truth presents a different picture. On the periphery of the sphere of truth in each department of learning lie disputed matters about which experts are not in agreement. Out of each conflict of opinio n emerges the investigations, researches, criticisms, and arguments by which it is hoped the disputes can be resolved and agreement achieved. In this sphere of truth disagreement is profitable.
On the other hand, in matters of taste, there is no point in arguing, disputes are fruitless. Arguing about such matters will not bring us into agreement. On the contrary, we should wisely live with and gladly tolerate differences of opinion th at express divergent tastes. (In matters of taste, the only reasonable resolution of our differences is that we fully acquiese in irreducible pluralism. This is expressed in the classical Latin expression: "De gustibus, non est disputandum."
About matters of truth, the opposite maxim should rule: "De veritate disputandum est." About matters of truth, dispute is fruitful. Wherever the truth of our judgments, opinions, or beliefs is a proper concern, we should be prepared to argue w ith those who disagree with us, with the firm hope that our disagreement can be resolved. Wisdom does not counsel us here to desist from the effort to reach agreement. Disagreement about matters of truth is not, in the final reckoning, to be tolerated. . . . Unanimous agreement is the appropriate condition of the human mind with regard to anything that is a matter of truth rather than a matter of taste. (With regards to the nature of reality, intellectual integrity demands that we attempt to be of one mind about how it truly is. We may never reach it in our study of one or another aspect of the real world, but unanimity remains the goal.)
One further polarity characterizes the two spheres. The sphere of truth is transcultural. . . The agreement of those who are competent to judge in the fields of mathematics and experimental science transcends all national boundaries as well as the ethnic and cultural barriers that separate different subgroups of mankind. In the sphere of taste, mankind is divided into a multitude of factions and is always likely to remain so. This is not only the fact of the matter, but it is also a fa ct capable of enriching
human life greatly.
In which of the two categories of truth and taste, should we place philosophical opinions and religious beliefs. The prevalent view today in academic circles tends to place such matters on the side of taste rather than on the side of truth.
Regarding this problem, I must content myself with three brief observations.
First, whatever allocation one makes, the determination itself should be regarded as a judgment that is genuinely disputable. It, therefore, belongs in the sphere of truth rather than of taste.
Second, if the judgment is that philosophy and religion are composite in character, combining matters of truth with matters of taste, then, in so far as these matters can be separated, they should be dealt with in a manner that is appropriate to the sp here to which they belong.
Third, to whatever extent philosophical opinions belong to the sphere of truth, we should look upon disputed questions in these fields as resolvable by rational means.
When we recognize that the possession of truth is the ultimate good of the human mind, and, recognizing this, commit ourselves to the pursuit of truth we have a number of moral obligations to discharge.
About any human judgment we must ask, Does the judgment belong to the sphere of truth or to the sphere of taste?
Upon deciding that it belongs to the sphere of truth, we should then look for and examine the grounds upon which it may be judged either true or false.
If our own affirmation or denial of its truth brings us into disagreement with others (either about whether it properly belongs to the sphere of truth or about whether it is true), then we must take whatever steps of inquiry can be employed effectivel y to resolve such disagreement.
(1)This material is taken largely from the 7th chapter of SIX GREAT IDEAS, by M.Adler