Three types of skepticism deserve our attention. Two of the three tend to involve mistakes that should be avoided, but the third is that measure of sound skepticism that wisdom urges us to adopt.

Pyrrho, a philosopher of antiquity, has been regarded as the outstanding exponent of extreme skepticism, and so in the history of Western thought extreme skepticism bears the label "Pyrrhonism."

(Cf. Plato's Theaetetus as cited in the previous chapter.)

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David Hume declared: "The great subverter of Pyrrhonism is action, and employment and the occupations of common life." Again, Hume says:

"These principles may flourish and triumph in the schools; where it is, indeed, difficult, if not impossible, to refute them. but as soon as they have left the shade, and by the presence of the real objects, which actuate our passions and sentimen ts, are put in opposition to the more powerful principles or our nature, they vanish like smoke, and leave the most determined sceptic in the same condition as other mortals.

A Pyrrhonian cannot expect, that his philosophy will have any constant influence on the mind: or if it had, that its influence would be beneficial to society. On the contrary, he must acknowledge, if he will acknowledge anything, that all human life must perish, were his principles universally and steadily to prevail. All discourse, all action would immediately cease; and men remain in a total lethargy, till the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable existence."

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A modified skepticism is present when we fail to distinguish between the truth or falsity that inheres in a proposition, and the judgment that a person makes with regard to the truth or falsity of the statement in question.

Consider the following remark that we hear frequently: "That may be true for you, but not for me." The other is an equally widespread misinterpretation of the remark: "That may have been true sometime ago, but no longer."

The truth of falsity of a statement derives from its relation to the ascertainable facts, not from its relation to the judgments that human beings make. I may affirm as true a statement that is in fact false. You may deny as false a statement tha t is in fact true. My affirmation and your denial in no way alter or affect the truth or falsity of the statements that you and I have wrongly judged. We do not make statements true or false by affirming or denying them. They have truth or falsity rega rdless of what we think, what opinions we hold, what judgments we make."

The mistake of identifying the truth or falsity of a statement with our attribution of truth or falsity to it can be easily corrected. Those who persist in the mistake turn truth and falsity into an entirely subjective affair. They are, in effect , espousing the position that what's true for me is true, and that's all there is to it.

The subjective aspect of truth lies in the claim that the individual makes for the veracity of his judgment. The objective aspect lies in the agreement or correspondence between what an individual believes or opines and the reality about which he i s making a judgment when he holds a certain belief or opinion. The objective aspect is the primary one. (There is a natural priority among the ideas of "is" "see" and "say.")

The form of skepticism that we have been examining is sometimes referred to as "subjectivism" and sometimes as "relativism.". . . It is widely prevalent even among persons who would not regard themselves as addicted to skepticism because they do not think of themselves as adopting the extreme skeptical view that nothing is either true or false. But they have, nevertheless, allowed themselves to fall back in to excessive skepticism by their refusal to acknowledge that subjective differenc es of opinion concerning what is true or false can be resolved by efforts to ascertain what is objectively true or false, remembering that the truth of a statement resides in its relation to reality, not in its relation to the individual's judgment abou t it.

Closely akin is the form of skepticism -or relativism- that makes the truth of a statement depend upon the circumstances of time and place. Everyone is acquainted with such remarks as "That may have been true in the Middle Ages., but it is no l onger true," or "That may be true for primitive people, but it is not true for us." The mistake here is exactly the same mistake as before.

If a given statement is ever objectively true, it is true forever and immutably true. . .What is mutable and variable with the circumstances of time and place are the opinions we hold concerning the true and the false, not what is objectively true and false.

The subjectivism and relativism we have been considering are much more prevalent in regard to goodness and beauty than they are with regard to truth. One reason for this may be that it is easier to correct the errors involved in the case of truth. (The good, and the beautiful deal with the practical intellect and therefore the motion of the mind involved in their pursuit terminates either in an artifact made by the thinker, or the moral self resulting from the way in which the thinker has chosen to "do" their life.)

Looking at the subjective aspect of truth, it offers us a correct interpretation of our conflicting and changing judgments concerning what is true or false. The fact that we differ in our judgments and change them from time to time should awaken us to the wisdom of a cautious restraint - not to regard our judgements as certain and secure, as infallible and incorrigible.

The fact that we often repudiate an earlier judgment and replace it later by one that is quite contrary to it should persuade us of the infirmity, frailty, and fallibility of the human mind in its efforts to get at the truth. Being persuaded of thi s should not lead us to abandon those efforts as entirely futile or fruitless, but it should restrain us from claiming certitude, finality, and incorrigibility for judgments that are subject to doubt, change, and correction.

There are no degrees of objective truth. A statement is either true or false objectively. But when, subjectively, we judge a statement to be true or false, we may do so with more or less assurance, and accordingly we may speak of it as being m ore or less true, or we may say that the probability of its being true is greater or less.

The form of skepticism that wisdom recommends we adopt is one that does not challenge the objectivity of truth, but it does enjoin us to recognize how few are the judgments concerning what is true for which we can rightly claim certitude and finalit y, and how many fall in the realm of doubt where they are subject to change and correction by all the means that human beings employ in their efforts to get at the truth. In fact, it is only in the realm of doubt that we engage in the pursuit of truth.

(1)This material is taken largely from the sixth chapter of SIX GREAT IDEAS, by M.Adler